Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have formally begun the legal process of withdrawing from the International Criminal Court, marking another major step in the three military-led governments’ effort to reshape their international alliances and reduce reliance on Western-backed institutions.
The Hague-based court confirmed that the three Sahel countries have deposited their instruments of withdrawal from the Rome Statute with the United Nations Secretary-General, triggering the one-year process required before their withdrawal takes legal effect. Niger’s notification was received on June 18, while Burkina Faso and Mali submitted theirs on June 24. Unless reversed, the withdrawals will become effective in June 2027.
The decision follows a joint announcement made by the three governments in September 2025, when they declared their intention to leave the court, accusing it of being “an instrument of neo-colonial repression” and alleging that it applies selective justice by disproportionately targeting African states. The move is the latest chapter in a broader geopolitical realignment unfolding across the central Sahel.
Since military coups brought new governments to power in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger between 2020 and 2023, the three countries have steadily distanced themselves from Western partners. They have expelled French military forces, reduced defence cooperation with Europe and the United States, withdrawn from the Economic Community of West African States, formed the Alliance of Sahel States and strengthened security and diplomatic ties with Russia.
Their withdrawal from the ICC reinforces that trajectory by targeting another institution the juntas view as reflecting Western political influence.
The ICC was established in 2002 to prosecute individuals accused of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression when national courts are unable or unwilling to do so. While more than 120 countries remain parties to the Rome Statute, several major powers, including the United States, China and Russia, are not members of the court. Although the three countries have begun the withdrawal process, their obligations under the Rome Statute do not end immediately.
Under Article 127 of the treaty, states remain bound by the court’s jurisdiction until the one-year withdrawal period expires. Existing investigations and obligations also continue beyond withdrawal. That means the ICC’s ongoing investigation into alleged war crimes in Mali, which began in 2013, will continue regardless of the country’s departure.
The court has expressed regret over the decision, saying it remains committed to engaging with the three governments and stressing the importance of international cooperation in combating impunity for the world’s gravest crimes. Human rights organisations have reacted more critically.
Groups including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International argue that leaving the ICC risks reducing avenues for accountability in countries where armed conflicts continue to generate allegations of abuses by both insurgent groups and state forces. They contend that withdrawal could weaken victims’ access to international justice if domestic judicial systems are unable to prosecute serious crimes effectively.
Instead, they argue that justice should be pursued through sovereign national or regional mechanisms rather than international institutions they believe have failed to apply international law impartially. The three governments have previously indicated that they intend to strengthen what they describe as indigenous African approaches to justice and accountability.
Whether that vision materialises remains uncertain. What is already clear is that the withdrawal from the ICC extends a broader political strategy that has redefined the Sahel’s relationship with traditional Western institutions.
From ECOWAS to the ICC, the military-led governments are steadily replacing long-standing multilateral ties with a model centred on sovereignty, regional self-reliance and alternative international partnerships. Whether that shift ultimately delivers greater stability, stronger institutions and improved governance will remain one of the defining questions for the future of the Sahel.